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Luiz Carlos Bresser 
Pereira* 
This article examines State intervention in the 
Brazilian economy, in an attempt to elucidate why 
the State ceased to play a decisive part in the 
country's development. The primary explanation 
lies in the cyclical nature of State intervention. In the 
beginning, intervention tended to be very successful, 
especially when the country was launching its 
industrialization phase. Gradually, however, the 
distortions inherent in intervention without some 
form of market control began to accumulate, leading 
the State into fiscal crisis. The current neoliberal 
wave and its success in advocating privatizations can 
be understood in these terms. The State had become 
bloated, not only in Brazil but also in other countries, 
giving rise in the past 20 years'to the need to shrink it 
and reorganize its finances. In view of these 
circumstances, the author observes that the 
pragmatic attitude adopted by East Asian and South-
East Asian economists to this problem, i.e., 
favouring a basic market orientation and fiscal 
discipline without hesitating to resort to State 
intervention when necessary, could be very useful. 
•Professor of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation, 
Sao Paulo, and editor of Revista de Economía Politica. 
Article based on a paper presented at the Fifteenth 
International Congress of the Latin American Studies 
Association, Miami, December 1989. 
Introduction 
State intervention is certainly one of the most 
intensely debated economic and political subjects 
in this century. There are two reasons for this, 
one factual, the other ideological. As a matter of 
fact, State intervention in the economy is 
relevant for the simple reason that governments 
all over the world, in rich and poor countries, in 
capitalist and statist countries, are continuously 
intervening in the market. For ideological 
reasons, State intervention is important because 
to favour or oppose some degree of State 
intervention is a basic criterion for 
distinguishing the Right from the Left, 
conservatives from liberals, neoclassical or 
neoliberal economists from progressive or 
Keynesian economists. 
At certain times limited State intervention 
becomes a relatively acceptable practice. This 
clearly occurred in the 1950s and 1960s, when a 
Keynesian consensus prevailed; in others, as in 
the last 20 years, the conservative attack on State 
intervention becomes dominant. Whereas 
earlier the failures of the market were contrasted 
with the possibilities of policy-making and 
planning, now the inverse type of reasoning is 
the new truth of a "new Right", whose ideas are 
based in economics and the market, rather than 
in the political philosophy and ideas about 
tradition and hierarchy that defined the "old 
Right" (Bosanquet, 1983). 
In macroeconomics the appearance of 
monetarism in the 1960s and of the "new 
classical" school based on rational expectations 
in the 1970s are the best symptoms of this 
conservative wave. Behind the rise of the new 
Right in the macroeconomic field we have the 
collapse of the Keynesian consensus: on the one 
hand, the State had become too big and 
inefficient, plagued by a fiscal crisis (O'Connor, 
1973); on the other, standard Keynesian 
economic policies based on the assumption of 
chronic insufficiency of demand failed to cope 
with rising unemployment and increasing rates 
of inflation. In development economics, the 
failure of the "big push" industrialization 
theories, which were behind the dominant 
import substitution model of industrialization of 
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the 1950s and 1960s, gave rise, in the 1970s, to 
an export-led, market-oriented theory of 
growth, whose basic tenets were and continue to 
be privatization and trade liberalization. The 
fact that countries which adopted the export-led 
strategy, such as Korea and Taiwan, did so in 
combination with aggressive industrial policies 
rather than leaving the fate of the economy to 
the market did not hinder the followers of the 
new credo to use these countries as examples of 
their ideas. Finally, in comparative economics, 
the failure of statist economies to maintain the 
high rates of growth achieved in the 1950s and 
the 1960s throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
served as a powerful ideological argument 
favouring neoliberal theory. The launching of 
perestroïka in the Soviet Union and the 
subsequent breakdown of the communist 
governments in Eastern Europe were presented 
as the empirical demonstration of neoliberal 
ideas. The neoliberal rhetorical strategy was to 
view support for limited State intervention in 
the same way as the extreme State control of the 
economy prevailing in the statist countries. 
State intervention in modern times has assumed 
three forms, corresponding to three historical 
models of development: i) the State as a 
substitute for the market in the co-ordination of 
the economy (statist or Soviet model); ii) the 
State as a decisive agent in promoting capital 
accumulation and technological development 
(the historical German and Japanese model of 
industrialization adopted in varying degrees by 
most developing countries in this century); and 
iii) the State as macroeconomic policy-maker, 
promoter of welfare, microeconomic regulator 
of the influence business enterprises have on the 
market and the environment, fiscal stimulator of 
technological growth geared toward 
international competitiveness, and bargaining 
agent for international trade on behalf of their 
respective countries (present OECD-countries 
model). The first historical model of State 
More recently this neoliberal wave is coming 
under attack. The insufficiencies of monetarism 
and rational expectations are becoming 
manifest. The status of State intervention in 
economic theory is again changing. The 
simplistic idea held by the new Right that "the 
market is good, and government bad" cannot be 
sustained on theoretical and practical grounds. 
Changes in the way that market and State 
intervention are viewed are related to its 
recurrent successes and failures. As long as the 
practice of State intervention is functioning 
successfully, the theories that support limited 
intervention are in favour. Yet as soon as they 
stop working or prove disfunctional for some 
reason, the voices of conservatives or neoliberals 
become louder. In another paper (Bresser 
Pereira, 1988 b) I discussed the cyclical and ever-
changing nature of State intervention. In this 
paper I will apply the theory to the Brazilian 
case. In addition, taking Asian economists as a 
reference point, I will argue in favour of a more 
pragmatic or dialectical approach to State 
intervention in market-oriented economies. 
intervention falls outside the scope of this paper. 
I will discuss State intervention in Brazil, taking 
for granted that we are dealing with a capitalist, 
market-oriented economic system, in transition 
from the second to the third model of 
intervention. 
My general contention is that some degree of 
State intervention is necessary to run capitalist 
countries. Without it economic growth and 
social well-being will suffer. The market is by far 
the best co-ordinator of the economy, and yet it is 
not able to allocate resources and guarantee 
growth in an optimal way. On the other hand, 
the market is a very poor institution for 
achieving income distribution. That is why the 
neoliberals' radical stand against State 
intervention is essentially ideological. This does 
not mean, however, that their position is simply 
incorrect. On the contrary, their views may be 
I 
The cyclical character of state intervention 
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quite functional. Their constant contention that 
State intervention, in trying to cope with the 
insufficiencies of market co-ordination of the 
economy, finally provokes worse distortions 
should not be too readily dismissed. 
In practical terms State intervention in a 
given sector of the economy tends initially to be 
effective, i.e., tends to correct the co-ordinative 
insufficiencies of the market; however, since 
public officials seldom know when to stop the 
intervention process, it eventually ends up being 
inefficient. Regulations become casuistic, the 
protection offered to certain industries ceases to 
be transitory —as it should always be— and 
tends to become permanent, State expenditures 
and State tax reductions tend to increase at a 
higher rate than State revenues, public deficit 
and public debt increase and the threat of a fiscal 
crisis becomes increasingly present.1 
If State intervention were not necessary and 
efficient in its early stages, it would not occur 
with such frequency. It is always possible to 
explain State intervention as an irrational result 
of interest-group pressures striving for some 
kind of protection, but the resulting government 
In the Brazilian case the cyclical and changing 
character of State intervention is quite clear. In 
the past, from the 1930s to the 1970s, the State 
performed a decisive role in promoting 
economic growth; in the 1980s, given the fiscal 
crisis, the State lost its capacity to promote 
economic growth and became a basic obstacle to 
it.2 
Some economists and political scientists in 
Brazil, who previously supported State 
intervention for the protection of local industry 
•The classical analysis of the tendency of modern capitalist 
economies to fall into a fiscal crisis was made by James O'Connor 
(1973). 
2The literature concerning State intervention in Brazil is 
quiteextensive. See, for instance, Wilson Suzigan (1976, 1988), 
Luciano Martins ( 1985), Peter Evans (1979), Fernando Rezende da 
Silva (1972). 
policies are just one type of State intervention. 
Even if we acknowledge, following Mancur 
Olson's suggestion (1975, 1982), that 
organizations which represent large groups are 
less effective in producing public goods than 
small interest groups, the fact is that most State 
regulations are oriented to the general interest 
rather than to particular or sectoral ones. This 
was a clear advance of modern democracies, 
which should not be dismissed by conservative 
thought. 
To say that State intervention is, in 
principle, efficient or inefficient makes no sense. 
State intervention may be efficient or inefficient, 
necessary or unnecessary, should be reduced or 
increased, depending on each specific situation. 
In general terms, State intervention will be 
necessary and efficient in the initial phase of the 
intervention cycle, whereas it will become 
excessive and inefficient in its final phase. In this 
phase the State probably will already be inflated 
and will have become increasingly unable to act, 
given the interests of external (lobbying) and 
internal (technobureaucratic) constituencies 
that led the State into fiscal troubles if not into 
fiscal crisis. 
and the creation and development of State-
owned enterprises in those sectors where 
private capitalists were unable or unwilling to 
invest, today favour tarde liberalization and 
privatization. This does not mean that they have 
become conservative. It only means that Brazil is 
in a different phase of the State intervention 
cycle —one where it is necessary to reduce, 
streamline and tighten the State organization in 
order to overcome the fiscal crisis and create the 
conditions for a new stage of economic 
development. In this new phase the State will 
have a different but necessarily important 
economic role. 
Between the 1930s and the 1970s the pattern 
of State intervention in Brazil was permanently 
changing, but was effective in promoting 
economic development. Data on the growth of 
II 
The Brazilian case 
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the gross domestic product in this period 
demonstrate this quite clearly. In the 1930s the 
State began a long- term and initially successful 
industrial policy of import substitution. In the 
1940s and the 1950s State-owned enterprises 
were established in the basic sectors of the 
economy: steel, oil, electrical power and 
transportation. 
The 1960s represented a period of transition 
and fiscal adjustment, but the change in 
industrial policy was quite limited. The basic 
innovation of the technobureaucratic and 
authoritarian government that came to power at 
that time was a clear export-oriented policy. The 
objective was to export manufactured goods. But 
the protection of local industry, a basic 
character is t ic of impor t - subs t i tu t ion 
industrialization, was maintained. And direct 
investment by the State was resumed, as it 
nationalized the telephone industry and 
completed the nationalization of the electrical 
power industry. 
Finally, the 1970s were the years of the 
economic miracle (1968-1978) and the years of 
the Second National Plan of Development 1974-
1979 (II PND). This plan was characterized by 
the promotion of a new wave of import 
The crisis of the 1980s, defined by stagnation of 
per capita income and extraordinarily high rates 
of inflation,3 was the result of a series of errors 
made by the government, particularly at the end 
of the 1970s, combined with adverse changes in 
the international economy (second oil shock, 
interest shock and recession in the United 
States) in 1979. Between 1967 (a date that could 
be chosen as the first year of the new expansion 
cycle) and 1973, State intervention was 
successful in promoting economic growth. The 
31 have made two broad analyses of this crisis, one emphasiz-
ing its fiscal aspects and its foreign debt origins (1989a) and 
another which seeks to build a macroeconomic model out of it 
(1989b). 
substitution in the basic sectors of the economy 
(steel, non-ferrous metals, oil, petrochemicals) 
under the direct control of State-owned 
enterprises, and also by the decision to promote 
full import substitution in the private, mostly 
nationally-owned, capital goods industry. The 
1970s were also the years when Brazil acquired 
its huge international debt and began the process 
of State domestic debt. 
During these 50 years we may distinguish 
two cycles. The first came to an end in the mid-
1960s, when the military government resulting 
from the 1964 military coup was able to 
overcome the fiscal crisis and the recession that 
followed the excesses of President Kubistchek's 
Plano de Metas. Between 1964 and 1967 the 
Brazilian State was submitted to a fiscal 
macroeconomic adjustment and to structural 
reforms (indexation system, tax reform, 
financial reform, housing financial system 
reform) that re-established the State's capacity 
to promote forced savings and to channel them 
to direct State investments or to subsidized 
private investments. The second cycle is not yet 
complete, given that the country has not yet been 
able to overcome the fiscal and economic crisis of 
the 1980s. 
mistakes began in 1974 and became very serious 
in 1979. 
In 1974, just after the 1973 oil shock that led 
most industrialized countries to introduce severe 
adjustment processes, the Brazilian government 
decided to engage in an ambitious programme of 
economic development. My personal views 
about the II PND have changed over time. I was 
initially critical of it as being overly ambitious. I 
became favourable to it after Barros de Castro 
and Souza's analysis (1985) demonstrated that 
this plan was effective in consolidating a strong 
industrial infrastructure and in warranting a 
structural trade surplus for the country. Recently 
I have again become more critical of this plan. 
The decision to grow by taking advantage of the 
III 
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enormous supply of foreign loans at very low 
interest rates was quite understandable, 
although risky. But the decision to use this 
money primarily for investment in capital-
intensive import-substitution industries was a 
mistake, just as it was a mistake to maintain a 
high degree of protection for local industry. That 
would have been the right moment to use the 
foreign loans to increase the international 
competitiveness of Brazilian industry. It would 
have been the time to move towards an export-
oriented and technology-intensive model of 
growth, while beginning to liberalize foreign 
trade gradually. 
Meanwhile, Korea was making quite similar 
mistakes, becoming externally indebted in order 
to invest in import-substitution basic input 
industries (Koo and Nan, 1989). But at that 
time, Korea was also oriented to exports and 
starting a process of trade liberalization that 
fostered its basically export-led industrialization 
model. And in 1979, precisely the year Brazil was 
engaging in a new —and short-lived— populist 
"miracle", the Korean government was able to 
correct its industrial policy while promoting a 
rigorous fiscal adjustment, which led to a 5% 
reduction in the gross domestic product. 
In Brazil the "growth cum debt" strategy of 
State intervention turned into a disaster in 1979, 
In the 1980s, the basic consequence of the 
economic crisis was the paralysis of the State 
with regard to long-term economic policy. 
With the fiscal crisis and its basic consequences 
—acceleration of inflation and stagnation of 
the economy— the State became increasingly 
unable to define and implement long-term 
objectives. And nothing is more important for 
developing countries than an effective overall 
strategy of economic development. 
Such a deep economic crisis as that of the 
1980s is a clear signal that the old strategy of 
economic development is exhausted. The fiscal 
crisis is an indication that the model of State 
when the three above-mentioned external 
shocks hit its fragile —because already highly 
indebted— economy. At the time there was no 
other alternative but to adjust. However, the 
military government decided to do precisely the 
opposite. It held down the exchange rate, made 
the domestic interest rate negative and increased 
wages and consumption. The consequences of 
this populist yet conservative economic policy 
were disastrous. The foreign debt/export ratio, 
which at the beginning of 1979 had already 
reached a dangerous 2-to-l relationship, had 
increased two years later to 3-to-l. In 1979 a 
strong adjustment policy would have 
counterbalanced the indebtedness policies of the 
Second National Plan of Development. Two 
years later, adjustment alone was not enough; it 
became self-defeating. Now fiscal adjustment 
had to be combined with some form of debt 
reduction (see Bresser Pereira, 1988 and 1989b). 
After the populist policies of 1979-1980, 
efforts to adjust the economy, from 1981 to 1984 
and from 1987 to the present, became 
ineffective. Their only consequence was to 
reduce the investment rate and worsen the fiscal 
crisis. Between these two periods we had a new 
cycle of populist policies, beginning in 1985 with 
the New Republic and ending in 1986 with the 
disaster of the Cruzado Plan.4 
intervention in Brazil is exhausted as well. In 
other words, if crises are always signals of illness 
and an opportunity for change, it is clear today in 
Brazil that the form of State intervention that 
was crucial to the extraordinary pace of 
industrialization between the 1930s and the 
1970s must now undergo a complete overhaul. 
This crisis is also a signal that, more than the 
model of State intervention, it is the model of 
society in Brazil that is exhausted. Brazilian 
society is characterized by a very high degree of 
4
 See Jeffrey Sachs (1988) on the populist nature of the Cru-
zado Plan. 
IV 
Paralysis of the State 
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income concentration. As long as the country 
was developing quickly, income concentration 
was not a major problem. But once that 
development stopped, it became a major source 
of continuous and worsening social conflict —a 
conflict that underlies the public deficit and the 
acceleration of inflation. 
The translation into practical terms of the 
need for change in the development strategy or 
in the form of State intervention was reduced 
(particularly by World Bank economists) to the 
proposal of "structural reforms" that should be 
adopted by the developing countries. These 
reforms have a clear liberalizing intent. They are 
based on trade liberalization, deregulation and 
privatization. This is not the appropriate time to 
discuss these proposals.5 Although they are 
sometimes exaggerated in their demand for 
reduced State regulation and do not always 
consider the size of the countries, their general 
orientation is correct. They correspond to a 
given moment when State intervention, after a 
phase of excessive expansion, must now be 
reduced and its priorities changed. 
The three basic strategies used by the Brazi-
lian State for promoting industrialization were 
i) trade protection; ii) subsidies oriented either 
to import substitution or to export promotion, 
and iii) direct State investments in public servi-
ces and basic input industries (electricity, oil, 
steel, communications, railroads). As these 
strategies are ceasing to be functional in promot-
ing economic growth, an increasing consensus is 
emerging for a new strategy that should be based 
on three fundamental policies: i) elimination of 
generalized subsidies and incentives; ii) trade 
liberalization and case-by-case subsidies to tech-
nical progress in order to stimulate international 
competitiveness, and iii) privatization, which 
will help to solve the fiscal crisis of the State,6 
besides increasing the efficiency of resource 
allocation. 
Given the fact that Brazil is a large country, 
trade liberalization will be necessarily limited in 
5
 For a critique of the unrealistic nature of radical trade liber-
alization reforms sponsored by the World Bank, see Jeffrey Sachs 
(1987). 
6
 It is relevant to note that Ignacio Rangel, one of the out-
standing Brazilian economists who helped to formulate the indus-
comparison with smaller countries, but there is 
no doubt that a substantial degree of liberaliza-
tion will form an essential part of any future 
industrial policy. State-owned enterprises had a 
decisive role in the first phase of industrializa-
tion, but now, when efficiency is becoming cru-
cial and the State urgently needs financial 
resources to balance its accounts, privatization is 
a natural solution. The elimination of subsidies 
is essential to overcoming the fiscal crisis, but 
once stabilization is achieved a new industrial 
policy where an export orientation is tied to 
direct and indirect subsidies to technological 
development will be necessary. 
An increasing consensus is being reached in 
Brazil in relation to the need for these structural 
reforms. Yet they are not materializing. Why? 
Several reasons may be listed: the resistance of 
industrialists, who are afraid to lose subsidies, 
incentives and administrative and tariff protec-
tion, or the resistance of bureaucrats and of the 
traditional nationalist Left, who insist on 
defending State-owned enterprises. But the fun-
damental reason why little or nothing has been 
achieved in this area is the public sector's paraly-
sis due to the crisis. The government tries to 
establish a new long-term industrial and devel-
opment strategy and makes agreements with the 
World Bank towards structural reforms, but the 
results are clearly unsatisfactory. Reforms are 
not implemented because one of the basic char-
acteristics of an economic crisis, and particularly 
of a fiscal crisis, is the paralysis of economic 
policy. 
A fiscal crisis means that the State has no 
funds to finance a new economic policy; that 
policy-makers have neither the time nor the 
willingness to formulate and implement the new 
strategy. If in addition to fiscal crisis there is also 
a social crisis due to excessive income concentra-
tion, the consequence is a legitimacy crisis that 
permanently threatens the political system and 
aggravates the State's paralysis. 
trialization strategy via protection and direct State investment, has 
been speaking in favour of privatization of public services in order 
to promote needed investments in this area since he wrote the 
"Postface" of the third edition of A Inflação Brasileira (1978). 
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V 
Statist and neoliberal responses to the crisis 
The question now, after almost 10 years of 
economic stagnation and high rates of inflation, 
is how to get out of this crisis. Specifically, what 
we are discussing in this paper is the role State 
intervention plays in overcoming the crisis and 
in resuming growth. 
Neoliberals would respond to these two 
questions very simply. The crisis is to be 
overcome by fiscal adjustment. In order to have 
fiscal adjustment it will be necessary to privatize 
State-owned enterprises and deregulate the 
economy, reducing the size of the State 
apparatus. The objective will be the minimal 
State, given that "the State serves a double role, 
that of enforcing constitutional order and that of 
providing public goods" (Buchanan, 1974). 
The response that pragmatic and dialectical 
economists would give is again different. By 
pragmatic I mean those economist-technocrats 
who work within the State organization and 
define economic policy in most countries today. 
They are not theoretical economists, nor are they 
ideological economists.8 They are practical 
economists, directly involved in government. 
These economist-technocrats have existed 
for a long time. In Brazil, however, they have 
come under attack since the 1970s.9 As a defence 
mechanism, they have tended to disguise 
themselves, to make their existence as unnoticed 
as possible. Thus I was surprised to see, when I 
'This approach is well represented in Brazil by the weekly 
columns written by former ministers Roberto Campos and Delfim 
Neto, in O Estado de São Paulo and Folha da São Paulo, 
respectively. 
8It should be remembered that it is very difficult to distin-
guish theoretical from ideological economists. 
'This attack on the technobureaucracy was part of the long 
Brazilian transition to democracy. The alliance between the bour-
geosie and the military and civilian technobureaucrats was first 
Given that they are conservative and generally 
unable to distinguish old-time nationalism from 
the national interest, their understanding is that 
the foreign debt should be fully paid.7 
The response that statists or the old Left 
would give is quite different. They would suggest 
that to overcome the fiscal crisis it is necessary to 
increase taxes and reform the State organization 
and State-owned enterprises, eliminating 
inefficiencies and fighting corruption, but not 
reducing the size of the State. On the contrary, it 
should be increased in order to resume growth 
and achieve a less unequal distribution of income 
than the one existing in Brazil. Reduction of the 
debt should be a condition of repayment. 
participated in an international seminar in 
Tokyo in the summer of 1989,10 that most of the 
Asian economists present were members of 
their respective governments and defined 
themselves without embarrassment —on the 
contrary they seemed quite proud of it— as 
pragmatic technocrats in opposition to 
theoretical and ideological economists.11 
It is well known that the role of the State in 
the development of the East Asian and South-
East Asian countries, starting with Japan and 
then Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and, 
more recently, Thailand and Indonesia, was and 
continues to be very important.12 During the 
broken in Brazil in the mid-1970s. In my book, O Colapso de uma 
Aliança de Classes (1979), I analysed this political process. 
10
 "The Tokyo Symposium on the Present and Future of 
Pacific Basin Economy - A comparison of Asia and Latin America", 
sponsored by the Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo, 25-27 
July 1989. 
"Actually, some were also very competent theoretical 
economists. 
12On this point see, among others, Seiji Naya (1989). 
VI 
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1980s, while the Latin American countries have 
stagnated, the East Asian and South-East Asian 
countries are booming. Whereas per capita 
income actually decreased in the Latin American 
countries in this decade, it grew about 4% 
annually in these Asian countries. 
One explanation for this difference in 
economic performance is that Asian pragmatic 
economists combine a very strong fiscal 
discipline with a high degree of State 
intervention. But their discourse carefully avoids 
reference to State intervention, while they praise 
as much as they can their "market-oriented 
economies". They do believe in a market-
oriented economy, but they also believe in and 
practice a permanent State intervention. A good 
example of this general attitude is expressed by 
Seiji Naya: 
"The NIEs and the ASEAN-4 countries have 
largely allowed the market to work and have 
adopted a private sector approach to 
economic development... This does not 
mean that they are laissez-fair economies; in 
fact, governments intervene strongly... In 
East Asia there is a hierarchical relationship 
under which the government may directly 
influence the conduct of private enterprises 
for the benefit of the public good and in turn 
is expected to assist and protect them" 
(1989: 5 and 7). 
This oriental economic pragmatism includes 
a certain degree of pragmatic dissimulation. The 
members of the capitalist dominant class want to 
hear that their economies are market-oriented, 
and they say so. In Japan, for instance, 
government economists insist that the economic 
role of the public sector is currently a very small 
one. Only after a lot of questioning will they 
admit that the Japanese State presently 
dispenses large sums of money to subsidize 
technological development. This attitude is not 
dissimulated, however: it is dialectical. They 
indeed believe in the benefits of a market-
oriented economy and, at the same time, they 
know full well that the State continues to play a 
decisive role in economic development and 
income distribution —a distribution which, by 
the way, is extremely less unequal in their 
countries than in Latin America. 
The response that pragmatic and dialectical 
economists would give to the question of how to 
overcome the Brazilian economic crisis is quite 
clear. In the short run, given that the economic 
crisis is essentially a fiscal crisis, they would ask 
for fiscal discipline, for an effective fiscal 
adjustment that would eliminate the public 
deficit. However, given that the origin of the 
fiscal crisis is the foreign debt crisis and that it is 
practically impossible to eliminate the public 
deficit while honouring all interests related to 
this debt, they would demand debt reduction, 
which will be achieved only by a combination of 
negotiations and unilateral measures. In the 
medium term, they would privatize as many 
State-owned enterprises as possible and they 
would begin a process of trade liberalization. But 
their objective, in contrast with that of the 
neoliberals, would not be the "minimal State", 
but to reform the State so that it once again 
becomes capable of formulating and 
implementing effective economic policy. 
The new strategy adopted by pragmatic 
economists would not be based on direct State 
investment, much less on protection to 
inefficient import-substitution industries, but 
rather on the support of technological 
d e v e l o p m e n t to gain i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
competitiveness. On the other hand, they would 
support income distribution by increasing 
spending on education and health in a 
decentralized way. It is becoming increasingly 
clear that the high degree of income 
concentration which exists today in Brazil is a 
major obstacle to economic growth and price 
stability, as it permanently feeds a high degree of 
distributive conflict. 
This approach to State intervention and to 
solving the Brazilian economic crisis is 
dialectical as well as pragmatic for two reasons: 
i) because it simultaneously supports a strongly 
market -or ien ted economy and State 
intervention in the critical areas that the market 
is unable to co-ordinate and ii) because it 
acknowledges the cyclical nature of State 
intervention. Sometimes, as at the present 
moment, it is necessary to reduce the State and 
reshape it in order to render it more effective 
(able to implement public policies) and efficient 
(able to implement these policies at low cost). 
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But what I am suggesting is a dialectical 
rather than a pragmatic approach to economics 
and to State intervention. While rejecting the 
ideological pitch of neoliberal or statist 
economists, I am arguing in favour of economic 
theory and transparency of ideological 
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